

2

Denver: Queen City of the Colorado Realm

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In the spring of 1921, William Joseph Simmons stepped from a train at Denver's Union Station. Dressed in a well-fitted suit emblazoned with lodge buttons, this tall, heavy-set man attracted little notice from the crowd. Few Denverites realized that on the train platform stood the self-proclaimed Imperial Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.¹

Peering through his pince-nez glasses, Simmons immediately spotted his old friend Leo Kennedy. Kennedy, a Mason and former member of the anti-Catholic American Protective Association, hurriedly greeted Simmons and quickly led him from the station. Simmons's visit to Denver was part of a national recruiting drive. At Kennedy's request, the Imperial Wizard had scheduled a private meeting at the Brown Palace Hotel to explain the Klan message. The select group of prominent Denverites had already formed when Simmons and Kennedy arrived. With the fervor of a revivalist, Simmons extolled the virtues and principles of his new secret society. The men were convinced and he promptly initiated them. The Ku Klux Klan had arrived in Colorado and would soon spread to every county in the state.²

By train and automobile the kleagles scoured Colorado for prospective Klansmen. Topographic variations in the new sales territory influenced their efforts. In 1920, four of every ten Coloradans lived within a thirty-mile-wide strip running along the base of the foothills of the Rocky Mountains and extending the length of the state. Crowded into this band were all but one of Colorado's cities with a population of eight thousand or more. The urban centers were also physically close: Denver was only thirty miles from Boulder, fifty-four miles from Greeley, seventy miles from Colorado Springs, and 112 miles from Pueblo. Because they were so easily accessible, the people of this section experienced the most intensive Klan recruiting campaigns. Strong klaverns would soon appear in their midst able to exert great influence

in decision making. The Rocky Mountains to the west slowed Klan expansion; klaverns were not organized in western Colorado until 1924, several years after similar efforts on the Eastern Slope. Important Klan units would arise from Grand Junction in the north to Durango in the south, but the sparsely populated Western Slope proved most resistant to the Klan onslaught. At its height, the Invisible Empire claimed the allegiance of thirty-five to forty thousand Coloradans.³

The Klan offered a program of Americanism, militant Protestantism, fraternity, order, religious intolerance, and racial purity—a plethora of causes from which to choose. But such abstract causes could not generate membership unless they drew meaning from the immediate environment. Real community tensions and neighborhood conflicts rather than distant dangers produced Colorado Klan growth. “You cannot put into effect any set program,” insisted Hiram Wesley Evans, the Klan’s second Imperial Wizard, “for there are different needs in the various localities. Your program must embrace the needs of the people it must serve.”⁴ Klan leaders thus molded the movement to the needs of their Protestant neighbors and made the hooded order’s solutions to local problems appear reasonable and inexorable. Joining the Denver Klan, then, could mean something far different from membership in either the Pueblo or Grand Junction organizations.

The Colorado realm, moreover, was for several years immune from national Klan meddling. Distance, the distraction of the Imperial Wizard, and the personality of Colorado’s Grand Dragon enabled state Klansmen to develop their organizations in relative isolation. As a Grand Junction Klansman recalled: “We knew that the Klan came out of Georgia, but we never thought of them being at the head of it. We knew that they probably got a dollar out of our ten dollars to join . . . and we knew our bed sheets came from there. As far as we were concerned Denver was the head of it.”⁵

During the 1920s, Denver was the financial and commercial center of the Rocky Mountain West, unchallenged in a wide trade area extending for hundreds of miles in all directions. Primarily a distribution and collection point, the city never developed substantial heavy industry. Manufacturing was diversified, small scale, and oriented toward local and regional markets. Denver was also Colorado’s capital and largest city, containing slightly more than one-fourth of the state’s total population. The city’s 256,000 inhabitants were predominantly white

and Protestant. Only 6,175 blacks, 37,748 Catholics, and 17,000 Jews made their homes in the community. Aside from a few immigrant neighborhoods, the city was ethnically and culturally homogeneous.⁶

Soon after their initiation at the Brown Palace Hotel, the Ku Klux Klan's new recruits founded a klavern under the title "Denver Doers Club." The inspired initiates wasted no time in spreading the Klan message to friends and relatives. To coordinate recruiting efforts and direct the enlistment campaign, the Klan's Propagation Department in Atlanta quickly dispatched kleagles to the city. On June 17, 1921, after a few months of secret organizing, the Denver Klan was ready to announce its existence. The Klan boasted, in a letter to the *Denver Times*, of its ability and eagerness to suppress crime: "We are a law and order organization assisting at all time the authorities in every community in upholding law and order. Therefore we proclaim to the lawless element of the city and county of Denver and the state of Colorado that we are not only active now, but we were here yesterday, we are here today and we shall be here forever."⁷

In July, A. J. Padon, Jr., the Grand Goblin of Domain No. 7, which included Colorado, claimed that 175 Denver men had been recruited and promised 2,000 more members in ninety days. The Klan, he said, was ready to place these men at the disposal of the chief of police within three minutes whether day or night. Only with these additional forces could crime be driven from Denver. Americanism, relief of the poor, protection of the home, and brotherhood were also declared goals. The image-making process had only just begun.⁸

Anti-Klan sentiment quickly surfaced. Mayor Dewey C. Bailey condemned the Klan as a threat to lawful government and ordered an investigation. The city tax collector launched a probe into the local Klan's alleged failure to pay federal taxes on initiation fees and dues. Simultaneously, the Department of Justice sent agents to Denver to gather evidence for its investigation of the national Klan. In September the *Denver Express*, a liberal, labor-oriented newspaper, began the first of several exposés of Klan secrets.⁹

The Klan, partly in reaction to these moves, closed its recruiting office, and its kleagles left the city. Mention of the activities of the Denver Klan disappeared from the newspapers for the rest of the year. The Klan, however, had not surrendered; rather, a shift in tactics was needed. Responsibility fell into the hands of a nucleus of local men who chose to carry on their crusade underground. Klan leaders, now

shielded from hostile opinion makers and authorities, guided their movement through its formative stage. Quickly they organized and the ranks swelled.¹⁰

The leader of this determined band was an enigmatic Denver physician, John Galen Locke. Born in New York City in 1873, he came to Denver twenty years later to complete his medical education. In appearance, Locke was hardly awesome or inspiring. He was a short, fat man, weighing 250 pounds, who wore a Vandyke beard and a carefully trimmed moustache. Yet underneath this deceptive exterior was a charismatic personality possessing the necessary traits of leadership. Locke's genius for organization, his eloquence, and ability to inspire fanatical loyalty made him one of the most important factors in the growth of the Denver and Colorado Klans. Under his astute direction as Exalted Cyclops and later Grand Dragon, the Invisible Empire came to dominate not only Denver but the state.¹¹

Locke, despite his position as Klan leader, was rarely accused of bigotry. He had been married to a Catholic and paid the pew rents for his two Catholic secretaries. At Klan meetings Locke preached moderation and nonviolence; a Catholic priest credited him with preventing the bombing of Denver's Immaculate Conception Cathedral. For legal advice Locke turned to Catholics and Jews. It was neither prejudice nor money that lured Locke to the Klan; it was his lust for power. A close friend of the Grand Dragon declared: "He felt a sense of history and mission all of a sudden. Here, he, Dr. Locke, who had never done anything but work on this poor human carcass, was shaping the course of life of thousands of people. And he loved the power, he just loved it. No doubt about it."¹²

The Denver Klan reappeared in January 1922 with a donation to the Young Men's Christian Association. A month later Klansmen warned city health officials to take precautions against a threatened smallpox epidemic. Nine recent deaths attributed to the disease gave credence to Klan fears. In March a destitute widow received \$200 from the Denver klavern. Klansmen trumpeted these acts of benevolence and public service as evidence of their sincere desire to aid their fellow citizens. Such activities were also effective public relations devices that lessened community resistance and attracted new members. Visitations and contributions to Protestant churches reinforced the Klan's image of piety. Thus did Klan power grow. It was reflected not only in a larger membership base but in informal alliances with other, more established community organizations.¹³

The Klan's benevolent activities only briefly masked a darker side. On January 27, 1922, black janitor Ward Gash received a letter from the Denver Klan charging him with "intimate relations with white women" and "abusive language to, and in the presence of white women." He was warned to leave town by February 1. "Nigger," the note concluded, "do not look lightly upon this. Your hide is worth less to us than it is to you."¹⁴ Gash turned the letter over to District Attorney Philip Van Cise and promptly left Denver. Van Cise carefully investigated the Klan's charges and found them groundless, characterizing Gash as a "good boy." He then turned his anger against the Klan. A grand jury was called and began its probe of the Klan on March 10. A second Klan threat, sent this time to George Gross, the president of Denver's National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, made the grand jury's work more imperative. After a month, the grand jury issued a report returning no indictments but recommending further investigation. Van Cise decided against launching another formal inquiry and instead ordered five of his men to infiltrate the organization and spy on its activities. Van Cise's tactical decision helped guarantee Klan success. With Denver's publicity-minded mayor amenable merely to verbal anti-Klanism, the district attorney was the only city official in a position to exert the government's power against the secret order. When Van Cise opted for weekly spy reports and minimal infiltration, he removed the government as an effective obstacle to Klan ambitions.¹⁵

Denver's inability to generate an effective counterforce during the Klan's formative years, whether in the form of attitudes or an opposition organization, facilitated the movement's expansion. City officials underestimated their adversary and failed to pursue a policy of continual harassment and confrontation. Opinion makers—Protestant ministers, newspaper editors, and other leading community figures—emitted ambiguous signals; most were unable or perhaps unwilling to define the Klan as deviant. Rather than intimidating and exhausting the Klan, their silence created an atmosphere that allowed the secret society to gather resources—men, money, and goodwill—with only minor interference. The Klan easily defended itself against a confused and sporadic opposition composed mainly of minority group members. Protestant Denver accepted or at least tolerated the Klan and only occasionally questioned it as a legitimate response to community needs. It is not surprising, then, that within a year of its creation, the Denver Klan boasted 2,000 members.¹⁶

The Klan's most effective draw was its pledge to clean up Denver and rid the city of its criminal element. Police statistics revealed a significant rise in the crime rate during the early 1920s. "The wave of lawlessness sweeping Denver in 1921," reported the *Denver Express*, "exceeded all previous criminal reigns."¹⁷ Police arrested an average of fifty-three persons per day for a total of 19,649, an increase of 28 percent over the 1920 figure and almost double the number apprehended in 1919. The crime rate continued upward in 1922, and, although more cases were filed than in 1921, convictions declined. Prohibition law violators accounted for much of the increase. Liquor was cheap and easily obtainable, and police raids failed to dam the city's supply. Prostitution also flourished in the city. Although Denver police had officially closed the red-light district, lax regulation after World War I had enabled sixty brothels to reopen and scores of prostitutes to work the streets. Denver's drug problem was less publicized, but equally alarming. To stimulate business, organizers of the traffic were reported to be visiting high schools and distributing free samples. Confiscations and arrests failed to check the trade or lessen parental concern. In addition to bootlegging, prostitution, and narcotics, the city reeled under frequent and intense epidemics of burglaries, holdups, and murders. Unsolved crimes proliferated and further compromised police, who already were indicted for inefficiency and corruption. Distrustful of their police force and impatient with the court system, many Denverites turned to the Klan as the only agency capable of driving crime and vice from the community.¹⁸

The Denver Klan raised the Catholic specter to garner members. The Klan excoriated Catholics for their devotion to a false church and "pagan" worship. More important, kleagles accused Catholics of placing their allegiance to the pope above loyalty to the United States. Ever ready to expand his power, the pope had long coveted Protestant America. With Catholic votes he would elect men to do his bidding. Catholics in control of government would destroy the separation of church and state, ban the Bible, and end the freedoms of press, speech, and religion. In fact, the Klan argued, there were signs that the conspiracy had reached Denver. In 1921, a Colorado chapter of the National Council of Catholic Men was organized. Its objectives were vague: to unite Catholic men all over the United States for "general welfare work." Also in 1921, Catholics established the Colorado Apostolate to wage a campaign for converts and to aid Protestant ministers in their

"leap toward the light." Klansmen even spread rumors of a Knights of Columbus plot to arm the city's Catholics. For those alert to Catholic machinations, the news was ominous. Denver needed the Klan, said one early member, because "the Catholics and the Jews were taking over and we had to do something. So we went down to the Masonic Lodge and organized."¹⁹ Kleagles also searched the rosters of the anti-Catholic Loyal Orange Society, Night Riders, and American Protective Association for recruits. The long-dreaded Catholic revolution, given credence by local, tangible evidence and Klan speakers, had begun. Protestant rule was being challenged. Denver and Colorado had to be defended.²⁰

The kleagles did not create Denver's anti-Semitism; they merely exploited it. Denver's Jewish population had increased almost nine-fold between 1916 and 1926, to 17,000 persons. The Jews were primarily concentrated around West Colfax Avenue, an area derisively referred to as "Little Jerusalem" or "Jew Town." The compact settlement housed many immigrants and Orthodox Jews who maintained their traditional values and customs. Culturally, ethnically, and religiously distinct, the West Colfax Jewish community generated distrust and disgust among many Protestants. The inhabitants of the section, contended a former Klansman, were "cagy and aggressive, with Jew-stuff oozing out of every pore."²¹ Denverites were suspicious for reasons other than the community's alien nature. The public linked the Jews to bootlegging and illicit gambling operations.²²

The Italians of North Denver also incited Klan hostility. Little Italy was an enclave of old-world culture where Italian was spoken as often as English. The Klan's indictment, however, went beyond ethnicity and religion, for the colony was tagged as the source of Denver's supply of bootleg whiskey and wine and the center of the city drug traffic. The Italians, like the Jews, concentrated in a small but highly visible ethnic pocket, were an obvious fulcrum upon which to build the Klan.²³

Black Denver was numerically smaller but in rebellion against its second-class status. In the 1920s, blacks attempted to integrate downtown movie theaters, school social events, and municipal recreational facilities. Meanwhile, blacks were escaping from their Five Points ghetto and buying homes in white neighborhoods. They received a hostile reception. Whites reacted with mob violence, bombings, and covenants prohibiting the sale of homes to blacks. Thus, black efforts to

achieve equality posed an immediate threat to white control. White Denverites believed that racial mixing at school functions imperiled the chastity of their daughters. Property values, they feared, would surely plummet once blacks moved into all-white neighborhoods. It is not difficult to understand, then, why some Denverites looked to the Ku Klux Klan to preserve neighborhood homogeneity and restrain contentious blacks.²⁴

The Klan appeal involved more than its issue-oriented campaign. The Invisible Empire offered an exotic fraternal life complete with ghostly costumes and eerie burning crosses. Regular lodge nights were supplemented with parades, outings, concerts, and picnics. Somewhat akin to the lodge men were those seeking fun, adventure, and a share of the secret. Membership for a time became faddish; "everyone wanted in the Ku Klux Klan because it was the thing to do."²⁵ But such ties were usually fragile and dissolved after only a few meetings. As the Klan grew it also wielded an economic club to convince the reluctant. Employees filled out application blanks to get or keep jobs. Scores enlisted to increase business or prevent a boycott.²⁶

The multifaceted image and platform of the Ku Klux Klan offered something for everyone. The result was a loose coalition of diffuse, unorganized camps distinguished by their particular needs. Distinct groups are discernable, although the pattern is blurred, for few took out membership on the basis of a single feature of the Klan program. Aside from the opportunists, the coerced, and the faddists, whose influence was minimal, several salient groupings can be identified. The Klan contained a small hard core of true believers eager to save the community from marauding Catholics, Jews, and blacks. An allied bloc, less steeped in the rhetoric of prejudice, reacted to immediate threats to their homes and neighborhoods. The lodge men found the mysteries of Kloranic ritual more satisfying than minority baiting. Yet, none of these groups alone or combined was sufficient to propel the movement to power. Success came only when the Klan merged their grievances with demands to restore law and order to Denver. Many of those concerned about spreading lawlessness were not particularly bigoted. They tolerated the rabid passions of fellow Klansmen primarily because of a white Protestant heritage of distrust and the minority connection to crime. The Denver Klan's law and order emphasis reflected its drawing strength and the needs of its membership. Klan leaders representing the different interests guaranteed, however, that no issue was neglected.

A rough balance, through careful juggling, was thus affected under Dr. Locke's steady hand, which precluded any major radical thrusts.²⁷

The Denver environment proved congenial to Klan mobilization success. City government could not solve a stressful crime problem or suppress what appeared to be a coordinated minority uprising against Protestantism. Denverites who believed that local authorities had abandoned them could only look to the Ku Klux Klan for their salvation. Unfulfilled fellowship needs, too, sought an outlet. In John Galen Locke, the Klan found a charismatic leader who generated zealous enthusiasm among his followers. Locke, assisted by capable and energetic lieutenants, molded the Klan into a solution for almost every concern. In addition, the Klan encountered no substantial counterattack. A man did not fear his minister's censure or neighbor's scorn when he enlisted in the hooded society. The movement operated in an atmosphere devoid of widespread public hostility and a meaningful opposition. The risks were few, the rewards unlimited. With all variables tilted in the Klan's favor, it is not surprising that nearly seventeen thousand Denver men passed through the portals of the Invisible Empire. Klansmen also encouraged their wives, mothers, and sisters to form an auxiliary. Foreign-born Protestants enrolled in the Klan-sponsored Royal Riders of the Red Robe and the American Crusaders. Denver Klansmen even organized their children.

Still, the Klan had one hurdle to clear on the road to power. It had to attract the support of men and women whose needs or frustrations lacked the intensity to cause membership yet were sufficient to evoke sympathy for Klan aims. For this population, too, the interplay of Klan leadership, local tensions, governmental responsiveness, and community perceptions was crucial in confirming allegiance. Victory with these men and women would ensure Klan goals, for it would yield controlling influence over Denver's formal decision-making process.

The Denver Klan's program and growing strength dictated political action, and the first opportunity came in the Denver mayoral election of 1923. The hooded order secretly supported Benjamin F. Stapleton against the Republican incumbent Dewey Bailey. Stapleton, a former Denver judge, police magistrate, and postmaster, campaigned for office pledging a war on crime and vice, lower taxes, and efficient government. He counted among his allies the *Denver Post*, *Denver Express*, the Italian-American Social Club, and organized labor groups. Stapleton was the Klan's obvious choice; he was a close friend of Dr. Locke and

Klan member No. 1,128. Rumors of Stapleton's secret affiliations surfaced throughout the campaign, and he condemned the Klan to appease his Jewish and Catholic supporters. On election day, a coalition of Klan and anti-Klan forces swept him into office over an incumbent tainted with corruption and linked to organized crime.²⁸

Mayor Stapleton quickly implemented many of his campaign promises. The new administration stressed economy, weeded out corrupt members of the police department, and intensified anticrime activities. Although Stapleton appointed a few Catholics and Jews to office, the Klan's mark was very much in evidence. The mayor named fellow Klansman Rice Means as manager of safety and later city attorney. Klansman Reuben Hershey succeeded Means as manager of safety after first serving as manager of revenue. Klansmen filled the offices of clerk and recorder, manager of improvements and parks, and city accountant, among others. The mayor named a Klansman as chief of police and the department was heavily infiltrated with seven sergeants and dozens of patrolmen, all card-carrying members. Secret influence on the municipal court system was readily apparent. Kluxers served as justices of the peace and district court judges. The threat of Klan justice emanated not only from the bench but also from juries drawn from Klan membership lists.²⁹

Klan control encouraged militancy. Klansmen burned crosses at will throughout the city. The municipal auditorium was leased to the Klan for a recruiting lecture. Klansmen threatened to boycott businessmen advertising in the *Denver Express* and *Denver Catholic Register*. Mimeographed lists of proscribed Catholic merchants were circulated at Klan gatherings. Members routed their kavalkades past West Colfax synagogues and mocked worshipers. Jewish activists and Catholic priests were also subjected to physical harassment and death threats; "feeling ran so high that just the sight of a white collar set them off."³⁰ At least two Klan opponents were kidnapped and pistol whipped.³¹

While such acts are reprehensible and to be condemned, it is also necessary to consider them as tactics in a struggle for power. Klansmen, now protected from government retaliation, attempted to strengthen their position in the community. These incidents demonstrated to members and nonmembers that the Klan intended to carry out its pledge to shackle minorities. They also served to heighten movement unity and to hamper the mobilization of resources by anti-Klansmen.

Bigotry is thus only a partial answer. The quest for power also plays an explanatory role.

The Klan's domination of city hall prodded opponents to initiate a movement to recall Mayor Stapleton and they gathered sufficient signatures to force a special election in the summer, 1924. Anti-Klansmen selected former mayor Dewey Bailey as their candidate. The choice was unfortunate in light of the candidate's reputed underworld connections and earlier defeat by Stapleton. Bailey's antilabor record also dogged his efforts. Bailey based his campaign on one issue, Denver's invisible government. "If I am elected mayor of Denver," he promised, "there will be no nightgown tyranny in this town."³² Throughout the summer, prorecall speakers such as Juvenile Court Judge Benjamin Lindsey and *Denver Express* editor Sidney Whipple assailed the Klan and Stapleton's secret ties. The *Denver Post*, in its first major confrontation with the Klan, reiterated the recall's theme: "SHALL THE KU KLUX KLAN, AN ANONYMOUS SECRET MASKED SOCIETY RULE DENVER, OR SHALL THE PEOPLE RULE DENVER? . . . ALL OTHER ISSUES, HOWEVER IMPORTANT THEY MAY SEEM, SINK INTO ABSOLUTE INSIGNIFICANCE."³³

Arrayed against recall were organizations as formidable as they were diverse: the Anti-Saloon League, Denver Labor County Central Committee, Colored Citizens League, and the Denver Ministerial Alliance. The Stapleton campaign also drew strong support from the *Rocky Mountain News*, *Denver Democrat*, and the *Colorado Labor Advocate*. The antirecall forces contended that disgruntled political job seekers and bootleggers in league with yellow journalists had engineered the drive to seize power for their selfish ends. The Klan issue was merely a ruse to distract the voters.³⁴

Despite other sources of support, however, Stapleton's most powerful ally was the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan dominated the Stapleton campaign, contributing more than fifteen thousand dollars and scores of election workers. On July 14, 1924, Mayor Stapleton addressed a Klan gathering and reaffirmed his commitment: "I have little to say, except that I will work with the Klan and for the Klan in the coming election, heart and soul. And if I am re-elected, I shall give the Klan the kind of administration it wants."³⁵ Police Chief William Candlish later clarified Stapleton's words: "Another term with the mayor and the red necks and slimy Jews would crawl into their holes and pull the holes in after them."³⁶

Election day was peaceful as the city cast the heaviest vote in its history. Stapleton swamped Bailey at the polls, piling up 55,130 votes to

23,808 and winning all sixteen election districts. Stapleton was routed only in the West Colfax Jewish precincts. Noting the size of the Stapleton vote, the *Denver Post* remarked, "*The victory yesterday proves beyond any doubt that the Ku Klux Klan is the largest, most cohesive and most efficiently organized political force in the State of Colorado today.*"³⁷ The Klan and its leaders had managed Stapleton to victory by refusing to do battle on the invisible government issue. By avoiding the subject, the winning coalition of strange bedfellows was forged. Moreover, Klan campaigners shrewdly capitalized on anti-Klan blunders, especially the naming of Bailey as the recall candidate. Many who opposed recall as a matter of principle or who detested Bailey chose Stapleton without regard to his position concerning the Klan. Thus enough indifferent or sympathetic non-Klansmen had voted with the minority to defeat the recall.³⁸

"They came from City hall and from the suburbs," observed a *Denver Express* reporter stationed outside a Klan meeting. "Tall, short, young and old—some well dressed by tailors and some from Curtis Street second hand stores."³⁹ Who joined the Ku Klux Klan? The hood and robe concealed the identities of the Klan's rank and file. Membership lists were closely guarded, and rarely did the names of ordinary Klansmen appear in the newspapers. Were Klansmen the stereotypic "marginal men" of American society seeking shelter from failure in a mass organization? Was the Klan a movement of a particular social and economic class? Was the Klan a symptom of working-class authoritarianism? Or did the Klan's diverse appeal attract a cross section of the white, Protestant, male population?

Fortunately, Denver's Klansmen have not been lost, because the official Roster of Members as well as the 1924 Membership Applications Book have been preserved. A statistical investigation of the Denver Klan's 17,000 members offers key insights into the Invisible Empire. To test the long-held observation that early joining Klansmen differed in socioeconomic status from late joiners and to examine membership patterns over time, the Klan roster was divided into early and late joiner groups and random samples of 375 and 583 men, respectively, drawn from each for analysis. This division also mirrored the Klan's shift from its formative stage to a more aggressive and open involvement in the community.⁴⁰

Few differences were detected between these two groups in terms of age, marital status, place of birth, or military service. The Denver Klan

was a movement of mature men and not an uprising of callow, thrill-seeking youths. The overwhelming majority of members were thirty years of age or older when they entered the Invisible Empire. Teenage Klansmen represented just 1 percent of recruits. Stability and maturity are also reflected in marital status statistics. More than three-quarters of the men were married, with only 1 percent divorced. The Midwest, not the South, was the Klan's chief spawning ground. Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and the rest of the states of the east and west north-central regions furnished the bulk of Denver's Klan population. Although one-third of Denver men were native to the state, Colorado-born Klansmen comprised less than a fourth of the two sample groups. Fewer than one-fourth of the late joiners and one-fifth of the early joiners were born in cities of a hundred thousand or more and most members claimed a rural and small-town background. In Klan ranks, recently discharged veterans were noticeable by their absence. All but a fraction of the Klansmen had escaped service in any of America's wars. Missing past crusades to defend American freedom and democracy, perhaps many saw the Klan as the means to compensate for lost opportunities to serve.

Klansmen were both long-time residents and recent migrants to the city. Early joiners resided in Denver an average 13.5 years as compared to 9.5 years for the late joiners. One-third of the early joiners and one-fifth of the later members resided in Denver eighteen years or more. Fifty-three percent of the later joiners, as opposed to 37 percent of the early joiners, lived in Denver six years or less; 41 percent to 27 percent, three years or less. The visible impression that early joiners tended to reside in Denver for longer periods is supported by Pearson's coefficient of contingency (.53).

A striking contrast between early and late joiners appears in regard to membership in fraternities other than the Klan. Seventy-six percent of the late-joining Klansmen had no known fraternal ties. Forty-eight percent of the early joiners had no known fraternal affiliations, but 34 percent were members of two or more orders. These differences reflect changes in the methods of recruiting between the Klan's arrival and the stage of intensive organizing. Early in the Klan period the lodge was a prime site for contacting non-Klansmen. Later, as the saturation point was reached in the lodge room, other recruiting techniques were brought into play. A changing membership also indicated a transition in the Klan's appeal and meaning.

Occupational differences between the two Klan groups were considerable (Table 2.1).⁴¹ Early joiners engaged in high and middle nonmanual occupations comprised over 50 percent of their group, while just 21 percent of the late joiners shared an equal status. At the same time, 43 percent of the late joiners labored in occupations below low nonmanual as compared to a little over 16 percent of the early joiners. Only in the low nonmanual category do the groups contain similar proportions of men.

TABLE 2.1

Occupational Distribution of Denver Klansmen, 1921-25, Compared with the Occupational Distribution of Denver's Male Population in 1920.

Occupational Status Group	<i>Early Joiners</i>		<i>Late Joiners</i>		<i>Male Population</i>
	N	Percent	N	Percent	Percent
High nonmanual	58	15.5	15	3.0	4.7
Middle nonmanual	135	36.0	107	18.0	14.5
Low nonmanual	76	20.3	140	24.0	22.3
Skilled	32	8.5	110	19.0	18.0
Semiskilled and Service	28	7.5	102	17.0	21.0
Unskilled	2	0.5	40	7.0	13.5
Unknown	44	11.7	69	12.0	6.0
Total	375		583		

Source: *Denver City Directory*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Occupations*, IV, 1095-98.

The late joiner's occupational distribution was a cross section of the wider Denver structure in all but the unskilled category. Conversely, high and middle nonmanual job holders among the early joiners are heavily overrepresented relative to the Denver population. When the two groups are united, the early joiners, skewed as a result of recruiting bias, disrupt the representative nature of the later joiners. In the combined Klan membership, the high and middle nonmanual categories are overrepresented, the low nonmanual bloc equivalent, and all blue-collar divisions underrepresented. Thus, a larger proportion of men in upper occupational groups appeared in the Klan than did in the

outer environment. Semiskilled and unskilled workers were the least likely to share the secrets of the Invisible Empire. The numerical domination of clerical and blue-collar workers in the Ku Klux Klan is, therefore, misleading. The Klan attracted a greater number of men holding low nonmanual and manual jobs, not because of the alleged intolerance or status anxiety of these groups, but, rather, because of the character of Denver's economy. There were simply more Denverites in occupations below the middle nonmanual line than above it, and the Klan reflected this distribution. Hence, what at first glance seems to have been a movement of the lower middle and working classes was actually a wider-based organization, a somewhat distorted mirror image of the population encompassing all but the elite and unskilled.

Selective recruiting explains much of the socioeconomic variation between early and late joiners. Early joiners were contacted through restricted lodge, business, and professional channels, while the late joiners were conscripted in a mass membership drive. The early joiners were economically and fraternally one step below Denver's elite, while the later joiners closely approximated the larger society. Significant differences were observed in length of residence, number of fraternal ties, and occupational status; that is, early joiners tended to live in Denver for longer periods, belong to more lodges, and hold higher-status jobs than late joiners. Diversity within the two blocs helped to lessen intergroup differences. A sizable number of early joiners had lived in the city only a short time before entering the Invisible Empire. Also, men in high and middle nonmanual occupations comprised 21 percent of the late joiner sample. Similarly, common life and generational experiences united the heterogeneous membership. The knights were mature men with families. The majority had roots in the farms and small towns of Colorado and the Midwest. Almost all had remained on the home front during World War I. The men shared issue interests as well. Regardless of circumstances, they formed informal factions based on their specific needs and concerns.

The Denver case supports the conception of a highly diversified membership. The Klan's complex appeal, rooted in a shared Protestant identity and cache of symbols, was designed to attract men from every station on the socioeconomic spectrum. Excluding the elite and the unskilled, the Klan rank and file was a near occupational cross section of the local community. Modifications in recruiting methods and issue

salience enabled any white Protestant, regardless of background, to find a home in the Invisible Empire. The young, the elite, and the proletariat were the only groups that could not be accommodated under the invisible panoply.

In preparation for the 1924 elections, John Galen Locke, now Colorado's Grand Dragon, outlined a plan of political organization designed to win the state's two U.S. Senate seats, the governorship, control of the state legislature, and scores of county offices. Every county was assigned a Klan major who appointed a captain to each bloc of six precincts. Captains designated a sergeant for each precinct, who in turn chose corporals if more than six Klansmen or women resided in his area of responsibility. To the sergeants and corporals was handed the primary mission of corraling voters, registering them, and inducing them to vote. The organization demanded strict discipline and a regular flow of information up the chain of command. Locke later boasted that Klan methods were modeled "on those of the United States army, . . . [with] the added advantage of secrecy maintained by the uniform worn by the members. In secrecy resides the element of mystery; mystery shrouds strength and members and fear as well."⁴²

The Klan's political strategy eschewed violence and acceded to the accepted rules of acquiring power. Rather than forming a new political vehicle, Klansmen organized thoroughly at the grass-roots level and captured one of Colorado's major political parties. Absorbing new resources, continuing its intensive efforts, exerting strong discipline, and exploiting opportunities, the secret society triumphed where more conventional actors had failed. The minority had begun by outmaneuvering the majority and finished by commanding it.

When the state Democratic party fielded anti-Klan candidates for governor and Senate, the hooded order moved to infiltrate and capture the Republican party. The Klan selected as its candidate for governor District Judge Clarence Morley, a member of the Denver klavern and a loyal follower of John Galen Locke. Morley made no attempt to disguise his secret ties, hiring the leader of the Klan's foreign-born auxiliary as campaign manager and speaking at numerous Klan functions. With his two opponents splitting the anti-Klan vote, he told supporters: "Not for myself, mind you, do I wish to run, but for the benefit of the Klan. We must clean up the statehouse and place only Americans on guard."⁴³ For one of the U.S. Senate seats Locke chose Klansman Rice Means, Denver's city attorney. He, too, faced a divided opposition. The Klan

endorsed Colorado's incumbent senator, who was unchallenged in his bid for renomination. Given little chance of reelection because of a lackluster voting record, the senator allegedly contributed a major share of the Klan's campaign funds to obtain the hooded endorsement.⁴⁴

Flooding precinct meetings and county conventions, Klansmen and women placed their slates of candidates on the primary ballot for county offices and elected a sizable bloc of delegates to the Colorado Republican gathering. Klan candidates received their greatest support in the Denver area. Delegates pledged to Morley and Means swept a majority of the precinct selection contests and took control of the Republican county assembly. To increase its leverage, the Klan stationed Denver police officers at the entrance to the meeting with orders to deny admittance to "anyone who was not a member of the klan and, except delegates, no one but klansmen had tickets."⁴⁵ Under the guiding hand of Dr. Locke, who sat in the mayor's box in the rear of the auditorium, Klansmen committed 75 percent of their delegation to Morley and 55 percent to Means. The entire Klan ticket for county legislative and judicial offices was placed on the primary ballot. Although commanding only a minority of the votes at the Republican state convention, the Klan wielded sufficient strength to place its candidates' names on the primary ballot.⁴⁶

During the campaign the Klan built momentum for its candidates with a continuous series of rallies, parades, and political meetings. Klan politicians, meanwhile, gathered support outside hooded ranks with promises of government efficiency, spending cuts, and stricter enforcement of the prohibition laws. In Denver, one hundred prominent Republicans led by District Attorney Philip Van Cise formed the Visible Government League to fight the Ku Klux Klan. The League organized a successful petition drive that collected enough signatures to field an anti-Klan county ticket in the Republican primary. The Klan stepped up its campaign activities to meet the challenge. Klan leaders decreed that failure to register to vote was sufficient grounds for suspension from the Invisible Empire. Regular Klan business was postponed and biweekly klavern meetings were devoted to political speeches, campaign pep talks, and the initiation of new voters.⁴⁷

On election day, the Klan minority took advantage of Colorado's primary law, which permitted voters to choose ballots regardless of their party affiliation. Locke concentrated the order's strength in the Republican primary, reminding his men, "We are not Democrats or Republi-

cans but Klansmen."⁴⁸ Klan bloc voting, combined with a split in non-Klan ranks, produced a sweep for the Invisible Empire. Klan candidates won nomination for every state office but one. Huge Klan majorities in Denver snowed under Van Cise's Visible Government ticket. Except for two district judgeships, Klansmen won every legislative and judicial contest in the Denver Republican primary.⁴⁹

The Klan takeover of the Republican party fixed the course of the fall campaign. Although Colorado Democrats campaigned vigorously for farm relief and the rights of labor, they leveled their heaviest guns at the Ku Klux Klan. This assault on the Klan rallied their party and appealed to disaffected Republicans. Offsetting these defections were the new resources available for Klan use. Klan candidates, as the Republican party's official representatives, laid legitimate claim to the organization's vote-getting machinery and to its respectability. The Klansmen had also obtained the Republican birthright, the allegiance of dedicated party-line voters. This tie was so firm that many men and women voted for Klan Republicans against their personal principles.

Ignoring the invisible government issue, the Klan's candidates benefitted from a well-financed, grass-roots organization and rode to victory on the "Keep Cool With Coolidge" wave that engulfed Democrats throughout the United States in 1924. Klan supporters were elected to both Senate seats, and the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general, among others. Only two Democratic candidates for state office survived the Republican onslaught; both had the endorsement of the Ku Klux Klan. Meanwhile, Klan-backed Republicans and Democrats won legislative and judicial offices in Boulder, Pueblo, Weld, and in many other Colorado counties. Returns were equally gratifying in Denver, where only three district judgeships and the juvenile court escaped Klan nets.⁵⁰

A week after the election, Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans and the Grand Dragons of Georgia, Indiana, and Kansas arrived in Denver to bask in the Colorado Klan's victory. Dr. Locke, Governor-elect Morley, and Judge Albert Orahoad, as well as a phalanx of newspaper reporters and photographers, greeted the Evans entourage at Union Station. After welcoming ceremonies were completed, a motorcade flanked by Denver police officers brought the Imperial Wizard to the Brown Palace Hotel for conferences with state Klan leaders. The climate had certainly changed since 1921 when the Klan's first Imperial Wizard, William Simmons, had found it necessary to enter Denver surreptitiously. The

high point of Evans's visit came that night when he addressed a Klan meeting at the Cotton Mills stadium in South Denver. An estimated 35,000 persons, including 5,000 new recruits, heard the Imperial Wizard laud Locke, his knights, and the future leaders of the state of Colorado. In the winter of 1924-25, the Ku Klux Klan had reached the height of its influence. Mastering the means to power, however, would prove far simpler than exercising it.⁵¹

John Galen Locke and Denver Klan No. 1 confidently awaited the beginning of 1925. The Klan's phenomenal growth and electoral successes had shattered the opposition and left the Invisible Empire virtually unchallenged. One of the Denver klavern's own sat in the governor's chair while another represented Colorado in the United States Senate. Nineteen twenty-five was to be a year of consolidation, a time to rejoice in the organization's triumphs. In the new year, too, came evidence that the Klan was attempting to discard its image of notoriety and become a respected pillar of the community.

The Denver Klan began the year with a nine-day boxing and wrestling tournament given for the amusement of its members and all Denverites. A few months later the city was invited to the Cotton Mills stadium for an evening of musical entertainment by the 200-member Imperial Klan Band. Klan leaders became less reticent about their memberships, and their names and pictures appeared in the newspapers. Banquets honoring Klan notables were even broadcast over radio station KLZ for Denver's listening pleasure. The frenetic recruiting pace of 1924 gave way in the more relaxed atmosphere. Only 1,550 men were admitted into the Invisible Empire in the first six months of 1925, a sharp decline from the bumper harvests of the previous year.⁵²

The Klan was not as invincible as it appeared; beneath the surface came rumblings of dissension. Dr. Locke's dictation of the Klan's course had alienated a group of its leading members, the most prominent of whom was Denver Mayor Ben Stapleton. In November 1924, he had recruited a powerful ally, United States Senator-elect Rice Means, angered by Locke's lukewarm support during the campaign. Hoping to solidify his position, Means sought to convert the Klan into his personal vote-getting machine. While Locke rode the crest, the opposition commanded little influence with the rank and file. Still, Stapleton's and Means's positions gave them power bases from which to mobilize resources. The dissidents now waited for events that would heighten dissatisfaction and fire their cause.⁵³

They did not have to wait long. The Colorado Klan's and Locke's first defeat was suffered in state government during the early months of 1925. To make government more responsive to the Protestant majority, Governor Morley attempted to remove "disloyal" civil servants and minority group members by abolishing all government agencies. He then proposed to re-create the same bureaucratic boards under new names, this time with Klan staffs. In the state senate an opposition composed of Democrats and anti-Klan Republican holdovers elected before the emergence of the KKK coalesced to thwart administration intentions. Pursuing a strategy of delay and smothering Klan bills under the weight of procedure and debate, opponents stalemated the legislative process. Setbacks in state government drained the Klan of credibility, leading its members and nonmembers to reevaluate the movement's promise. So began a chain reaction that would reverse the factors that had been crucial to Klan growth.⁵⁴

In April 1925, to reassert his authority over the Denver police force and to embarrass the Klan, Mayor Stapleton launched the Good Friday vice raids. Bypassing Klan Chief of Police, William Candlish, the mayor secretly deputized 125 American Legionnaires to execute the operation. The raiders were highly successful, arresting over two hundred bootleggers, gamblers, and prostitutes. A series of follow-up raids in May gathered almost one hundred more offenders, confirming Stapleton's commitment to his clean-up campaign. The arrests exposed a complex network of tipoffs, graft, and protection, at the center of which were the hand-picked men of the Klan vice squad. Fourteen police officers were suspended, all but two of whom were well-known Klansmen. Police hearings conducted after the raids substantiated the charges and forced the dismissal of two sergeants and ten patrolmen. Authorities would uncover other scandals implicating Klansmen in and out of government service. These revelations seriously damaged the Klan's prestige and image as the community's protector. Such instances of corruption, prominently displayed in the newspapers, heightened the anger and disgust of the faithful, who wore the now-sullied sheets of the Invisible Empire. The Klan foundation had begun to crack. When membership ties loosened, resources needed to exert influence were withdrawn. Imperceptible at first, the downward spiral had started and picked up speed with the rising number of Klan mistakes and failures.⁵⁵

The Denver Klan, despite these setbacks, achieved two final victories. On May 5, Klan candidates emerged from a field of six to win places on

the Denver school board. Their success was as much the product of apathy and surprise as the Klan's campaign organization. Two weeks later, Denverites went to the polls to elect a new nine-member city council. Remarkably, no organization was formed to mobilize anti-Klan voters. Election returns gave six of the council seats to Klan-endorsed candidates.⁵⁶

The final act in the downfall of John Galen Locke began the day after the municipal elections. On May 20, Denver newspapers reported that federal officials were investigating the Grand Dragon's alleged failure to file income tax returns from 1913 to 1924. When Locke failed to cooperate with tax examiners he was imprisoned for ten days and fined. Jail buffered Locke from the dissension that was tearing his organization apart. Upon release, he moved quickly to rally his shaken followers. Locke held private conferences with leading Klansmen to convince them of his innocence. Klansmen were called to a special meeting to learn about the government's campaign to discredit their leader. Throughout the meeting Locke sat sullenly, his head in his hands, perhaps aware of the futility of his efforts. Many Klansmen, numbed by the spectacle of their leader behind bars, remained unconvinced. According to one member, Locke betrayed their trust and "took out a good part of the money."⁵⁷

John Galen Locke had been the Klan's architect. His charismatic and dynamic personality gave the Klan much of its unity; he was the cement that bound together the organization's heterogeneous factions. In command from the beginning, he was the visible symbol not only of Denver but of Colorado Klandom. Thus his disgrace proved to be far more than a personal injury. Public opinion generalized the scandal to the movement and forced it upon the shoulders of every knight. Members reeled even more from the shock of their leader's alleged perfidy. The leadership variable, which had been so crucial to Klan growth, now stimulated community disapproval and turned members from the cause.

The income tax investigation, perhaps instigated at the suggestion of Senator Rice Means, was the decisive incident the insurgents had long awaited. Means met with Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans in Washington, D.C., and argued the case for Locke's removal. The debate in the state legislature, the police department scandals, and now the imprisonment of the Grand Dragon had demoralized the knights and caused mass defections. Evans was receptive to these pleadings because he had for some time been suspicious of Locke's ambitions.

On June 30, 1925, the Imperial Wizard asked for Locke's resignation, later freezing all Colorado Klan assets. Seeing his opportunity, Mayor Stapleton declared his independence from secret influence by firing chief of police and Locke crony, William Candlish.⁵⁸

Locke relinquished command but then moved to challenge the Klan for the allegiance of its members by setting in motion the Minute Men of America, a new secret society. Nearly 5,000 of Denver's 17,000 Klansmen followed Locke into the Minute Men organization. Less than 1,000 reaffirmed their loyalty to the Invisible Empire. For the majority of Kluxers, the revolt was a means to sever all ties to 100 Percent Americanism. Many who joined the cause to save Denver from lawlessness and to restore governmental responsiveness felt betrayed. The police scandals and the income tax investigation had corrupted the organization's law and order reputation. Further, as the crime issue gradually waned, men questioned their obligations to a now superfluous body. Similarly, the Catholic and Jewish conspiracies to seize Protestant rights never materialized. Blacks, after their initial challenges to the racial status quo, settled back into their prescribed positions. Thus the question of Klan governmental responsiveness could act in both a positive and negative manner upon the movement's fortunes. Those who perceived Klan authorities as responsible for the decline in minority challenges could leave the order assured that the crisis had passed. On the other hand, Klan governmental failures convinced many to withdraw their allegiance. Dramatic Klan growth had created other problems. Men entering the Invisible Empire in search of fellowship and fraternity instead found meetings to be random affairs attended by hundreds and sometimes thousands of anonymous men. Even the economic lure was dulled as Minute Men and Klansmen launched counterboycotts and Catholics shunned the merchants of both groups. The Minute Men revolt merely hastened the fall of the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan's fragile coalition could not survive the defeat of its program in city and state government, the humiliation of its leader, or the absence of a multitude of enemies. Lacking success and a reason for existence, the order could offer its members only worn platitudes about Americanism, Protestantism, and white supremacy. Interest and commitment vanished, and with them money, votes, skills, and the various resource tokens necessary to influence community decision making. The arsenal depleted quickly and the declension spiral spun out of control.⁵⁹

By the end of 1926, the Minute Men had faded from the scene, never really expanding beyond its Denver base. Membership was, in effect, a highly emotional commitment to John Locke, a transitory state that quickly faded. Even the uniform proved debilitating; three-cornered hats and knee breeches could not replace the magic of the hood and robe. Dr. Locke lacked the patience and will to revive what had become moribund. Without issues or benefits, it could attract few men.⁶⁰

Slipping from one failure to another, Denver Klan No. 1 never regained its balance after the July 1925 Minute Men secession. Meetings resumed on August 15 in the Woodmen of the World Hall, following a month-long reorganization. Slightly more than one hundred Klansmen attended the gathering, their beliefs made consistent by charges that the pope had bribed Locke to revolt. In October, Klansmen organized a drive to recall three Denver judges for their alleged Minute Men memberships, but gained little support. A December klorero of Colorado Klansmen elected Baptist minister Fred Arnold of Canon City as the new Grand Dragon. Arnold's selection ended Denver's hegemony and reflected the shift in the Klan balance of power toward Western Slope klaverns. The new year brought no relief. The second annual Ku Klux Klan boxing and wrestling tournament received scant notice and drew few paying spectators. In May Denver Klansmen hosted a Memorial Day klorero, with thirty to forty thousand people expected to attend. Unfortunately for the Denver Klan, far fewer appeared at the celebration, and a much touted parade of strength through the streets of Denver attracted only 468 masked Klansmen and Klanswomen.⁶¹

Infrequent press releases marked the final years of the Denver Klan. On the night of July 24, 1928, 200 Klansmen demonstrated and ignited a cross on the lawn of a woman convicted of child abuse. In March 1932, the Klan blamed the Depression for hindering its growth but predicted future expansion. A year later Klansmen announced that they had infiltrated the Denver Communist party and were aware of the red menace's every move. In December 1933, protests from Jewish and Catholic organizations barred the entry of two Klan floats in an NRA-Blue Eagle parade. Having influenced neither opinion nor events for years, the Denver Klan's demise shortly thereafter went unnoticed.⁶²

Sheltering half of the state's hooded population, the Denver klavern was the center of Colorado Klandom. The Klan's initial objective had also been the first Colorado community to fall under the sway of

invisible government. The Denver Klan's cafeteria of appeals, molded to time and local events, drew strength from government inaction and unresponsiveness. White Protestant men from almost all socioeconomic strata and backgrounds responded to the call to save their homes and communities from disruptive groups. The credit for the Klan's success rested with its able leaders, for they attracted and then held this heterogeneous membership together. They made it possible for the movement to be simultaneously an agency for law and order, a fraternal home, and, for the newly arrived, a way station bedecked with the symbols of the small town. Operating in an atmosphere of tolerance and unhindered by opposition sniping, the Denver Klan's rise to power was swift. Yet, the descent from the pinnacle was even more abrupt. In just seven months the Ku Klux Klan lost its standing in the Denver community. Once initiated, the demobilization cycle had gathered momentum as it proceeded. The initial wound was opened in the state legislature, where anti-Klansmen routed their inexperienced foes. Then, in rapid succession, revelations of corruption, dissension, and leadership errors appeared to weaken a movement suffering from a loss in relevance. The bonds that unified the unstable and diverse Denver Klan coalition had begun to unravel. Members withdrew their loyalty, time, money, and votes, and the coalition crumbled. Klan leaders who had seemed so perceptive during the order's organizing stage now were unable to prevent the exit from influence. Simultaneously, hostile community perceptions militated against an attempt to reverse the spiral through recruitment of former or new members. In this new environment, the Denver klavern of the Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was rendered impotent.

NOTES

Portions of this essay appeared in Robert A. Goldberg, *Hooded Empire: The Ku Klux Klan in Colorado* (Urbana, 1981). Used by permission of the University of Illinois Press.

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Denver: Queen City of the Colorado Realm

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3. Colorado, Board of Immigration, *Year Book of the State of Colorado, 1919* (Denver, 1919), 5; Colorado, Board of Immigration, *Colorado: Eastern Colorado* (Denver, 1919), 8-38; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, 1, 82, 321, 323, 326.
4. Hiram Wesley Evans, "Where Do We Go From Here?" in *Papers Read at the Meeting of Grand Dragons, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan at Their First Annual Meeting* (Asheville, North Carolina, 1923), 7.
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6. William F. Christians, "Land Utilization in Denver" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1938), 2-4; Homer B. Vanderblue, *Denver the Industrial City* (Denver, 1922?), 3-4; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Occupations*, IV, 1095-98; *1919: Manufactures*, IX, 162-65; *1920: Population*, II, 47, 49, 52; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Population*, I, 22, III, 307; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1916*, I, 245-46; *Census of Religious Bodies: 1926*, I, 406-7.
7. *People of the State of Colorado v. W. R. Given*, 1922; *Denver Express*, September 17, 1921; *Denver Times*, June 17, 1921.
8. *Denver Post*, July 2, 8, 1921.
9. *Denver Express*, September 19, 21, 29, 1921.
10. *Ibid.*, September 17, 28, 1921.
11. *Denver Catholic Register*, February 26, 1948; Lee Casey, "When the Ku Klux Klan Controlled Colorado," *Rocky Mountain News*, June 17, 1946; interview with Glenn Saunders by James Davis, Denver, September 1, 1963; and *Denver Post*, August 14, 1924.
12. *Denver Catholic Register*, February 26, 1948; interview with Monsignor Gregory Smith, Denver, February 21, 1975; personal interview, Denver, September 12, 1975; interview with Ray Humphreys by James Davis, Denver, February 27, 1963; Saunders interview by Davis.
13. *Denver Catholic Register*, January 26, 1922; *Denver Express*, March 1, 1922; *Denver Post*, February 25, March 13, 1922.
14. Letter to Ward Gash, 1922, Ku Klux Klan Collection, Western History Department, Denver Public Library.
15. *Denver Post*, February 25, March 11, 13, July 28, August 29, 1922; interview with Robert R. Maiden by James Davis, Denver, January 20, 1963; Don Zylstra, "When the Ku Klux Klan Ran Denver," *Denver Post Roundup* (January 5, 1958), 6.
16. *Denver Times*, June 6, 1922.
17. *Denver Express*, January 3, 1922.

18. Interview with Robert R. Maiden, Denver, January 25, 1975; *Denver Post*, February 7, April 2, June 2, 3, August 21, September 21, October 4, 8, 13, 1921; January 22, March 24, April 23, July 14, 16, December 5, 31, 1922; January 1, March 31, 1923; December 28, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, September 9, 1921; Philip Van Cise, *Fighting the Underworld* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 21, 143, 148, 149; *Denver Express*, April 27, June 3, 1922.

19. Telephone conversation, Denver, September 28, 1975.

20. *Denver Catholic Register*, April 7, July 21, September 1, 15, 1921; *Denver Post*, March 21, July 26, 1923; Maiden interview by author; Monsignor Smith interview.

21. Personal interview, Denver, May 17, 1975.

22. Ida L. Uchill, *Pioneers, Peddlers, and Tsadikim* (Denver, 1961), 208-30; interview with Glenn Saunders by author, Denver, July 8, 1975; *Denver Jewish News*, June 18, 1919; May 25, August 24, 1921; Van Cise, *Fighting the Underworld*, 39; Maiden interview by author; *Denver Post*, October 15, 1921.

23. *Denver Express*, February 7, 1924; Carleton H. Reed, "A Culture-Area Study of Crime and Delinquency in the Italian Colony of Denver, Colorado" (Master's thesis, University of Colorado, 1940), 15-18; *Denver Post*, August 21, October 15, 1921; October 1, 1922; January 10, 1924; Maiden interview by author; Saunders interview by author.

24. Interview with Dr. Clarence Holmes, Denver, March 21, 1975; *Denver Post*, May 19, 28, June 18, September 21, November 11, 1920; December 2, 1921; February 5, 6, 8, 9, 1923; *Denver Express*, February 13, 1923; March 19, 1924; September 30, 1925.

25. Saunders interview by author.

26. *Denver Post*, January 15, April 26, June 25, 1925; *Denver Express*, June 17, 29, 1925; *Rocky Mountain America*, July 3, 1925; Holmes interview; interview with Forbes Parkhill by James Davis, Denver, March 4, 1963; Zylstra, "When the Klan Ran Denver," 6; Philip Van Cise Spy Reports, April 28, May 5, 1924, Klan Collection, Denver Public Library.

27. Saunders interview by author; personal interview, Denver, March 1, 1975; personal interview, Denver, February 10, 1975.

28. *Denver Post*, April 30, May 3, 1923; *Denver Express*, March 30, May 1, 3, 8, 12, 14, 1923; interview with Charles Ginsberg by James Davis, May 5, 1963; *Rocky Mountain News*, April 23, 29, June 27, 1923; *Colorado Labor Advocate*, May 3, 1923; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members, Ku Klux Klan Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado.

29. *Denver Post*, June 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 16, 26, July 16, 26, August 2, 1923; March 12, 31, 1924; *Denver Express*, May 31, June 2, 6, 14, 16, 1923; March 31, April 4, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, February 2, March 29, April 1, 1924; Maiden interviews by Davis and author; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members.

30. Monsignor Smith interview.

Denver: Queen City of the Colorado Realm

31. *Denver Post*, June 24, 27, October 29, November 13, 1923; January 12, 1924; *Denver Catholic Register*, April 3, June 19, 1924; July 2, 1925; *Denver Express*, October 29, November 3, 1923; January 12, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, November 11, 13, 1923; Van Cise Spy Reports, April 28, May 26, 1924.

32. *Denver Post*, August 9, 1924.

33. *Denver Post*, March 29, June 28, July 9, 13, 27, August 2, 3, 6, 1924.

34. *Denver Express*, February 25, 28, 1924; *Colorado Labor Advocate*, February 28, March 6, August 7, 1924; *Denver Times*, August 5, 11, 1924; *Denver Democrat*, August 16, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, June 27, July 15, August 7, 11, 1924.

35. *Denver Post*, August 3, 1924.

36. *Rocky Mountain News*, May 10, 1932; *Denver Express*, August 9, 1924; *Denver Post*, August 8, 11, 1924; Van Cise Spy Reports, July 14, 1924.

37. *Denver Post*, August 13, 1924.

38. Denver Election Commission Official Returns; *Denver Post*, August 12, 13, 1924; *Denver Express*, August 13, 1924; *Denver Catholic Register*, August 14, 1924.

39. *Denver Express*, April 1, 1924.

40. For a complete discussion of Klan membership in Denver, see Goldberg, *Hooded Empire*, 38-47.

41. Representative occupations for each category are:

High Nonmanual

banker, businessman (sufficient property), clergyman, lawyer, physician, teacher

Middle Nonmanual

accountant, businessman (small), farm owner (small), manager of a business

Low Nonmanual

bookkeeper, foreman, office clerk, salesman

Skilled

baker, brick mason, butcher, carpenter, furrier, machinist, painter, tailor

Semiskilled and Service

apprentice, barber, cook, driver, factory operative, janitor, policeman, waiter

Unskilled

laborer, porter

42. Philip Van Cise Scrapbook, private collection of Eleanor Drake, Denver; "Program of First Anniversary of the Realm of Colorado," May 13, 1924, Klan Collection, Denver Public Library; *Denver Post*, August 14, 1924.

43. *Denver Express*, August 8, 1924.

44. *Rocky Mountain News*, August 2, 1924; Ginsberg interview; interview with Morrison Shafroth, Denver, April 11, 1975; *Denver Post*, August 5, 1924.

45. *Denver Post*, August 5, 1924.

46. "The Rise and Fall of Dr. John Galen Locke," KOA radio broadcast, Denver, February 23, 1962; *Denver Post*, August 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, August 5, 7, 1924; *Denver Express*, August 4, 1924.

47. Van Cise Spy Reports, May 26, July 21, August 22, September 1, 8, 1924; *Denver Express*, August 19, 1924; interview with O. Otto Moore by James Davis, Denver, October 7, 1962; Parkhill interview.
48. Van Cise Spy Reports, May 26, 1924.
49. *Denver Post*, September 10, 11, 12, 1924.
50. *Denver Express*, November 5, 1924.
51. *Denver Post*, November 11, 12, 1924.
52. *Denver Post*, January 15, 16, 17, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, January 14, 1925; Roster of Klan Members.
53. Saunders interview by author; *Denver Post*, September 26, November 26, 1924; February 26, 1925.
54. Goldberg, *Hooded Empire*, 84-95.
55. *Denver Post*, April 11, 16, 30, May 1, 3, 22, 24, June 2, 4, September 22, November 22, 1925.
56. *Denver Express*, April 4, May 5, 13, 18, 20, 27, 1925.
57. *Denver Post*, May 20, 26, 27, 28, 30, June 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 1925; *Denver Express*, June 13, 1925; *The United States of America v. John Galen Locke*, Case 7911, U.S. District Court for Colorado, 1925; Maiden interview by Davis; personal interview, Denver, March 1, 1975.
58. *Denver Post*, July 1, 23, 1925; Zylstra, "When the Klan Ran Denver," 7; *Denver Express*, May 28, July 2, 25, 1925; *Rocky Mountain American*, July 17, 31, 1925.
59. Personal interview, Denver, May 17, 1975; Ginsberg interview; *Denver Post*, May 10, 12, June 27, 1925.
60. John Galen Locke returned to his medical practice in 1927. In 1935, the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals ruled that Locke had earned no income from Klan sources and was even entitled to a refund on his 1925 assessment. On April 1, 1935, Locke died of a heart attack at the age of sixty-one. The night after his internment, a band of ex-Klansmen secretly entered the cemetery and burned a cross before his crypt.
61. *Denver Post*, August 15, October 6, 17, December 9, 1925; January 6, May 23, 28, 30, 1926; *Pueblo Chieftain*, March 14, 1926; *Protestant Herald*, May 28, 1926; *Denver Express*, May 31, 1926.
62. *Denver Post*, July 25, 1928; *Kourier Magazine*, March 1932; February, December 1933.